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Abstract
We derive a simple relation between a quantum channel’s capacity to convey
coherent (quantum) information and its usefulness for quantum cryptography.
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A quantum communication channel can be used to perform a variety of tasks, including:
• Conveying classical information from a sender to a receiver.
• Conveying quantum information (including quantum entanglement) from a sender to
a receiver.
• Creating shared information between a sender and receiver, information that is reliably
secret from any third party and can thus be used as a cryptographic key for later private
communication. (The use of quantum channels to aid in cryptographic tasks such as
key distribution is called quantum cryptography.)
Each of these tasks can be performed in the presence of noise. Indeed, in quantum cryptog-
raphy the noise is of central importance in revealing the activity of an eavesdropper.
Deutsch et al. [1] examined the security of quantum cryptographic schemes over quantum
channels that contain noise. They pointed out that any protocol which allowed “entangle-
ment purification” between two parties automatically provided a means of communicating
secret information that no third party could share. Here we will continue this line of thought
by showing that the privacy of the channel, measured by the amount of information available
to the receiver that is not available to any eavesdropper, can be made at least as great as
the channel’s coherent information [2].
Suppose Alice prepares a quantum system Q in an initial state ρQ. Alice conveys the
system Q through a noisy quantum channel to Bob. The noisy channel may be described
by a superoperator EQ, so that the final state ρQ
′
= EQ(ρQ).
The evolution of the channel given by the superoperator EQ is in fact unitary evolution on
a larger quantum system that includes the environment E of the system. This environment
may be considered to be initially in a pure state
∣∣∣0E
〉
. In this case, the superoperator is
given by
E
Q(ρQ) = TrEU
QE
(
ρQ ⊗
∣∣∣0E
〉〈
0E
∣∣∣
)
UQE
†
. (1)
We can assume that the environment is initially in a pure state without any loss of generality,
since we can always imagine that a “local” environment in a mixed state is just part of a
larger system in a pure entangled state.
We imagine first that the initial mixed state ρQ of Q arises from Q’s entanglement with
some other “reference” system R in Alice’s possession. Alice’s goal in sending Q to Bob is
to establish some quantum entanglement between her reference system R and Bob’s output
system Q′. That is, Alice is sending quantum information via the channel to Bob.
As discussed in [3], the entropy exchange Se measures the amount of information that
is exchanged between the system Q and the environment E during their interaction. If
the environment is initially in a pure state, the entropy exchange is just the environment’s
entropy after the interaction—i.e., Se = S(ρ
E′), where ρE
′
is the final state of E. (The
entropy here is just the ordinary von Neumann entropy of a density operator, S(ρ) =
−Trρ log ρ.) The entropy exchange is entirely determined by the initial state ρQ of Q and the
channel dynamics superoperator EQ; that is, the entropy exchange is a property “intrinsic”
to Q and its dynamics.
The coherent information Ie, introduced in [2], is given by
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Ie = S(ρ
Q′)− Se. (2)
The coherent information has many properties that suggest it as the proper measure of the
quantum information conveyed from Alice to Bob by the channel. For example, Ie can never
be increased by quantum data processing performed by Bob on the channel output, and
perfect quantum error correction of the channel output is possible for Bob if and only if no
coherent information is lost in the channel [2]. The coherent information seems to be related
to the capacity of a quantum channel to convey quantum states with high fidelity [4].
Alice might on the other hand be using the channel to send classical information to Bob.
Alice prepares Q in one of a set of possible “signal states” ρQk , which are used by Alice with
a priori probabilities pk. The average state ρ
Q is given by
ρQ =
∑
k
pkρ
Q
k . (3)
Bob receives the kth signal as ρQ
′
k = E
Q(ρQk ). Because the superoperator is linear, the average
received state is
ρQ
′
=
∑
k
pkE
Q(ρQk ) = E
Q(ρQ). (4)
Bob attempts to decode Alice’s message (that is, to identify which signal state was chosen
by Alice) by measuring some decoding observable on his received system Q′.
The amount of classical information conveyed from Alice to Bob, which we will denote
HBob, is governed by the quantity χ
Q′, defined by
χQ
′
= S(ρQ
′
)−
∑
k
pkS(ρ
Q′
k ). (5)
This quantity is significant in two ways:
• HBob ≤ χ
Q′ , regardless of the decoding observable chosen [5,6].
• HBob can be made as close as desired to to χ
Q′ by a suitable choice of code and decoding
observable. To make HBob near χ
Q′, Alice must in general use the channel many times
and employ code words composed of many signals; Bob must perform his decoding
measurement on entire code words. The net result is that the channel is used N times
to send up to NχQ
′
bits of classical information reliably [7].
In short, χQ
′
represents an upper bound on the classical information conveyed from Alice to
Bob, an upper bound that may be approached arbitrarily closely if Alice and Bob use the
channel efficiently.
If this general picture is used to describe a quantum cryptographic channel, then the
eavesdropper (“Eve”) must be supposed to have access to some or all of the environment
system E with which Q interacts. In other words, the environment includes any apparatus
used by Eve to gather information about Alice and Bob’s communication. The evolution
superoperator EQ thus describes all of the effects of the eavesdropper on the channel; or, to
put it another way, all of the eavesdropper’s efforts at “tapping” the link between Alice and
Bob are contained in the interaction operator UQE . The information HEve available to the
eavesdropper will be limited by
3
χE
′
= S(ρE
′
)−
∑
k
pkS(ρ
E′
k ). (6)
The limitation HEve ≤ χ
E′ holds whether or not Eve has access to the entire environment.
If Eve can only see a subsystem D of the full environment, then we can make the stronger
statement HEve ≤ χ
D′, where χD
′
≤ χE
′
[6].
We define the “privacy” P of a channel to be
P = HBob −HEve. (7)
This definition makes sense, because any positive difference HBob − HEve can be exploited
by Alice and Bob to create a reliably secret string of key bits of length about P [8].
Alice and Bob wish to make P as large as possible. However, they cannot control the
actions of the eavesdropper. Thus, they must assume that the eavesdropper is acquiring
her greatest possible information from the channel. The “guaranteed privacy” PG = inf P ,
where the infimum is taken over all of Eve’s possible strategies that are consistent with the
superoperator EQ describing the channel. Since HEve ≤ χ
E′, we have
PG ≥ HBob − χ
E′. (8)
Alice and Bob will want to use the channel to make the guaranteed privacy PG as great
as possible. Let P = supPG be the optimal guaranteed privacy, where the supremum is
taken over all strategies that Alice and Bob may employ to use the channel. How big is P?
As discussed above, by suitable choice of code and decoding observable, HBob can be made
arbitrarily close to χQ
′
. Thus,
P ≥ χQ
′
− χE
′
. (9)
If Alice and Bob were simply trying to optimize HBob over a given noisy channel, it is
known [7] that they can do no better than to choose pure states of Q as the inputs signal
states of the channel. Here, they are instead trying to maximize the guaranteed privacy PG,
so that pure state inputs may not be optimal. However, we can certainly find a lower bound
for P by considering χQ
′
− χE
′
for pure state inputs.
Assume that the states of Q initially prepared by Alice are pure states
∣∣∣φQk
〉
; also recall
that the environment E can be presumed to begin in a pure state
∣∣∣0E
〉
. After Q and
E interact unitarily, the joint state
∣∣∣ΨQE′k
〉
= UQE
∣∣∣φQk
〉
⊗
∣∣∣0E
〉
will also be a pure state,
generally an entangled one. The subsystem states, described by density operators
ρ
Q′
k = TrE
∣∣∣ΨQE′k
〉〈
ΨQE
′
k
∣∣∣
ρE
′
k = TrQ
∣∣∣ΨQE′k
〉〈
ΨQE
′
k
∣∣∣ , (10)
will have exactly the same non-zero eigenvalues, so that S(ρQ
′
k ) = S(ρ
E′
k ). Therefore
IQ = S(ρQ
′
)− Se
= S(ρQ
′
)− S(ρE
′
)
= S(ρQ
′
)−
∑
k
pkS(ρ
Q′
k )− S(ρ
E′) +
∑
k
pkS(ρ
E′
k )
IQ = χQ
′
− χE
′
. (11)
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We conclude that
P ≥ IQ. (12)
In other words, the ability of the quantum channel to send private information is at least as
great as its ability to send coherent information. This result may be viewed as a quantum
information theoretic basis for quantum cryptography.
It is interesting to note that, although both χQ
′
and χE
′
depend on the choice of pure
state inputs for the channel Q, the difference χQ
′
− χE
′
depends only on the overall density
operator ρQ for the inputs.
We have assumed that the properties of the channel, given by the superoperator EQ, are
known to Alice and Bob. If EQ is known, and if IQ > 0 for some ρQ, then the channel may
be used to send private information securely. However, this does not address the question
of how Alice and Bob can establish the necessary properties of the channel without being
deceived by Eve.
We would like to thank W. K. Wootters and M. A. Nielsen for helpful conversations and
suggestions.
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